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Abstract This article establishes that Arrow’s General Possibility Theorem has only indi-
rect application to engineering design. Arrow’s Theorem states that there can be
no consistent, equitable method for social choice. Many engineering design de-
cisions are based on the aggregation of preferences. The foundation of many en-
gineering decision methods is the explicit comparison of degrees of preference,
a comparison that is not available in the social choice problem. This explicit
comparison of preference levels is coupled with the choice of an aggregation
method, and some forms of aggregation may be inadequate or inappropriate in
engineering design.
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1. Introduction
Important tasks in engineering design are to generate and reﬁne design al-
ternatives, and then to select a single design, or a set of designs, to fulﬁll a
particular need. In informal terms, the latter problem may be stated, “Find
the best alternative(s).” Sometimes the determination of “best” is relatively
straightforward and unambiguous, as in: “Find the lightest alternative,” or,
“Find the stiffest alternative.” Sometimes it is less so, as in: “Find the light-
est, stiffest alternative.” This simple directive is inadequate to choose between
one alternative that is stiff but heavy, and another alternative that is light but
compliant.
This engineering design decision problem is a problem of decision with
multiple criteria, and can be stated as follows:
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Given several performance criteria which are to be simultaneously optimized,
determine a method for comparing any two design alternatives that depends
only the values of the individual criteria for each alternative.
The multiple criteria engineering design decision problem has been addressed
by various decision-making systems, such as Quality Function Deployment
(QFD) [6], the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) [13], Pugh charts [12], and
multi-criteria optimization [11], all of which help guide designers in choos-
ing designs to meet a global performance criterion based on the aggregation
of performances on distinct criteria. It is generally assumed that evaluation
on the basis of any of the individual criteria is straightforward. In practice,
the calculation of the individual criteria may require considerable engineer-
ing judgement or resources. It is also assumed that any two alternatives could
be compared directly, without resorting to individual criteria. In practice, engi-
neers working on the designs do not make these direct comparisons, but instead
work to meet performance speciﬁcations. The expertise to assess individual
performance criteria is often distributed throughout an engineering enterprise.
A method to compare alternatives based on separate criteria is an efﬁcient and
feasible alternative to direct comparison.
In addition to the engineering decision methods listed above, there is an
extensive literature in decision theory on the topic of multiple criteria decision-
making by an individual decision maker (see, for instance, [10], [4], [8]). The
idealized decision maker of decision theory need not be an individual person.
Rather, it is assumed that there is a single entity that renders decisions; the
inner workings of that entity may safely be ignored.
The problem of decision with multiple criteria is similar to the problem
of social choice, or group decision-making, in which the rankings of several
alternatives by individuals are to be combined into a single, “social,” ranking
(e.g., selecting candidates inamulti-party election). Insocial choice, ofcourse,
there is no longer a single decision maker, and the goal is to arrive at rational
decisions that respect the sovereignty of the individual citizens involved in the
decision. In the theory of group decision-making, a well-known objection to
the validity of combining separate weak orders into a single social order is
Kenneth J. Arrow’s General Possibility Theorem [1, 2].
Various engineering design decision methods, such asthose mentioned above,
depend on the aggregation of several weak orders into a single order. Further-
more, it iscommon for manyindividuals toparticipate inan engineering design
decision. Recent discussions in the design research community have raised the
question of the applicability of Arrow’s Theorem to decision-making in en-
gineering design [7]. The relevance of Arrow’s Theorem to the engineering
design decision problem depends on whether making a decision in engineer-
ing design is sufﬁciently similar to a social choice problem, or to a decision
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This paper shows how Arrow’s Theorem does not apply to the multi-criteria
engineering decision problem. It further shows that, despite the common par-
ticipation of many individuals in engineering design decisions, engineering
design is closer to multiple criteria decision-making than it is to social choice.
Thus, engineering design decision-making occupies a middle ground between
decision with an idealized decision maker and decision by groups of fully au-
tonomous citizens, and on this middle ground Arrow’s Theorem has no detri-
mental consequences.
Also related to multiple criteria analysis is decision under uncertainty, in
which the problem is to determine the best alternative when the consequences
of each alternative are probability distributions over possible outcomes (e.g.,
investment decisions). Both multiple criteria analysis and decision under un-
certainty usually overlay the weak ordering of alternatives with a numerical
scale.
1.1 Preliminaries: Notation and Denitions
Design alternatives are distinguished by uppercase Roman characters:
A, B, C, :::
Design criteria are denoted by lowercase italics: x, y, z, :::
Individuals or voters are denoted by Arabic numerals: 1, 2, 3, :::
The most basic concept in the ranking of alternatives is simple comparison,
in which there is no association of numbers with alternatives, but only the
notion that one alternative A is preferred to another alternative B. A ranking
that depends only upon simple comparison is called a weak order:
Deﬁnition 1 A weak order on a set of alternatives ~ X = fA;B;C;:::gis a
transitive binary relation  such that for any two elements A and B, either
A  B (A is at least as preferable as B), or B  A (B is at least as preferable
as A). Indifference is possible: if A  B and B  A, then one writes A  B
(A is indifferent to B). If A  B but B  = A,t h e nAis (strictly) preferred to B,
written A  B.
A weak order is an ordinal ranking: it orders the alternatives without assign-
ing numerical values. Any computational method for decision-making requires
the further structure of a numerical scale that ranks alternatives. Such a numer-
ical scale is called a value function. The familiar > and  on the real numbers
of the value function correspond to the preference relations  and  among
alternatives:
Deﬁnition 2 A value function is an assignment of real numbers to alternatives
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function maps a set together with a weak order f ~ X;g to the real numbers
with its usual ordering fIR; g. For a value function v, v(A)  v(B) iff.
A  B, with equality for indifference.
While it is always possible to construct a value function from a weak order
(see [9]), the mere assignment of a value function does not imply a measure
of degree of acceptability. A value function is of greater use in a computa-
tional decision method if the numerical scale can be used to compare levels
of acceptability. The weak order A  B  C is captured both by v1,w h e r e
v 1(A) = 10, v1(B) = 9,a n dv 1 (C) = 1, and by v2,w h e r ev 2 (A) = 10,
v2(B) = 2,a n dv 2(C) = 1, but the relative preference for A, B,a n dCimplied
by the two value functions is quite different. It shall be shown below that the
correct speciﬁcation of the numerical scale is crucial to the satisfactory reso-
lution of both the multi-criteria decision problem and the problem of decision
under uncertainty.
2. Arrow's Impossibility Theorem and its
implications for the aggregation of preference
Kenneth J. Arrow’s General Possibility Theorem, now commonly known as
Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem or simply Arrow’s Theorem, is an important
and powerful result in the theory of social choice. For that reason, and because
a thorough understanding of Arrow’s Theorem will facilitate a comparison be-
tween the social choice and multi-criteria decision problems, the Impossibility
Theorem will be presented here. The treatment refers mainly to [1] and [2].
2.1 The motivating paradox
The context of Arrow’s work is politico-economic. Political scientists are
interested in determining a “fair” method of reconciling the potentially con-
ﬂicting interests of individuals in a society. Economists seek the most “satis-
factory” distribution of a set of commodities throughout a society. The similar-
ities between the two problems are evident, and indeed both can be formalized
in the same way; the notions of “fair” and “satisfactory” are explored through
this formalization.
Themajority method ofdecision-making isonepossible answer totheloosely
formulated question of fair social choice, and one that is sufﬁciently obvious
that a contradiction that arises from its employment motivates the Impossibil-
ity Theorem. For an odd number of people and two options to choose among,
a simple vote is guaranteed to satisfy the most people. But when there are
three alternatives, a paradox arises: say that there are three voters, one who
orders the options A  B  C, another who holds B  C  A, and a third
who holds C  A  B. These preferences are shown in Table 9.1. All threeArrow's Theorem and Engineering Design Decision Making 209
Table 9.1 Weak orders of three voters
1st 2nd 3rd
Voter 1 A B C
Voter 2 B C A
Voter 3 C A B
voters have rationally ordered preferences, but a pairwise vote shows that as a
group, these three prefer A to B, and prefer B to C, yet also prefer C to A.T h e
resulting social order is not rational, and provides no basis on which to make
a decision. This paradox is called the failure to ensure the transitivity of the
majority method,o rt h eparadox of voting [1, p. 2]. It is in the context of this
paradox that economists and political scientists explore the limits of “fair” and
“satisfactory” social choice: is there any procedure for aggregating social pref-
erences that can avoid this paradox? Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem shows
that, given a particular set of axioms that deﬁne fair and satisfactory, there is
no procedure that can (always) fulﬁll them all. The formal proof proceeds from
the description of the problem with a set of axioms.
2.2 Axioms for the social choice problem
By introducing axioms to deﬁne any decision problem, two ends are ac-
complished. Primarily, the problem is modelled so that conclusions about the
problem can be derived mathematically. Results are certain with respect to the
axiomatic model; their certainty with respect to real problems depends on the
validity of the axioms. Additionally, axioms cast such vague descriptions as
“fair” and “satisfactory” in precise terms.
The axioms which model the social choice problem make a formal state-
ment of requirements for any procedure that purports to solve the social choice
problem, in particular two high-level requirements: consistency of the result,
or rationality, and autonomy, or sovereignty, of the individual voters whose
preferences are to be combined.
The social choice problem considers decision cases where all options are
known, mutually exclusive, and ordered by individuals, and where the task
is to produce a single social order yielding the greatest overall beneﬁt while
respecting the equal worth of each individual (as with the idealized decision
maker, an “individual” is a single decision-making entity, not necessarily an
individual person). Note that in the social choice context, each weak order
corresponds to the wishes of an autonomous individual; in multiple criteria
decision, each order corresponds to a single criterion. In engineering design,
there may be many people involved, but decisions still depend upon the aggre-210 IMPRECISION IN ENGINEERING DESIGN
gation of engineering criteria. To formalize a desirable decision situation for
social choice, Arrow introduces ﬁve axioms [1, pp. 24-30]:
Axiom 1 (unrestricted domain) Each individual is free to order the alterna-
tives in any way.
Restricting Axiom 1 is one way to address the paradox, and methods that guar-
antee the transitivity of the majority method can be ranked by how severely
they restrict this freedom. It is not at all obvious that Axiom 1 is reasonable
for design decisions, as will be discussed below.
Axiom 2 (positive response) If a set of orders ranks A before B and a second
set of orders is identical except that individuals who ranked B before A are
entitled to switch, then A is before B in the second set of orders.
Axiom 2 is an ordinal version of monotonicity, and is a consistency or ratio-
nality requirement.
Axiom 3 (independence of irrelevant alternatives) If A is before B in a so-
cial order, then A is still before B if a third alternative C is ignored or added.
Note that Axiom 3 is violated in the motivating paradox, where the relative
rankings of A and B are inﬂuenced by the addition of the alternative C. Thus,
this axiom implicitly enforces the transitivity of the social order.
Axiom 4 (not imposed) An order is called imposed if some A is before some
B in all possible social orders. The social choice problem must not be imposed.
As Axiom 1 states that individuals can hold any preferences they like, Axiom 4
says that they have a reasonable expectation that their preferences are not ex-
cluded from being chosen as the social order. This is a fairness requirement.
Axiom 5 (not dictatorial) An order is called dictatorial if there is one indi-
vidual whose decisions dictate the social order. This is likewise not allowed.
Perhaps the simplest way to guarantee consistency of results is to violate Ax-
iom 5: by choosing an individual whose preferences exactly determine the
social order, the other four axioms are trivially satisﬁed. Such a solution is
intuitively unfair in a social choice context, and is not allowed. While there
is no need in engineering to respect all attributes equally, it is wasteful at best
to evaluate attributes that have no impact on the decision. Dictatorship by one
evaluation criterion is not a rational solution for engineering design. Some
engineering cultures may appear to have a dictator in the form of a single de-
cision maker, perhaps a manager with ultimate responsibility for all decisions;
however, decisions will still be made by considering several criteria. Rather
than violating Axiom 5, this changes the problem to decision with multiple
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In addition to these ﬁve axioms, there are implicit assumptions. Some are
merely technical: there are at least three alternatives, and there is an odd and
ﬁnite number of alternatives. One assumption, however, is substantive and cru-
cial. The social order must be chosen based only on the weak orders supplied
by the individuals; it is not permitted to ask for any further information to de-
termine strength of preference, as any comparison between individuals is held
to be meaningless.
2.3 The resulting contradiction
Arrow’s Theorem shows that a social choice function satisfying all ﬁve con-
ditions is an impossibility:
Theorem 1 Any social choice function satisfying Axioms 1–3 must be either
imposed or dictatorial.
The reader is referred to [1, pp. 51-59] or [2, pp. 20-21] for details of the proof,
but the basic line of reasoning is as follows. A decisive set of individuals for
A over B is a set who guarantee that A will be preferred to B whenever they
unanimously agree so; any decisive set must contain a smaller decisive set;
there is always a decisive set; any set that is decisive for A over B is decisive
for A over anything else and for anything else over B, and thus for all A over
all B; thus there must be a dictator. The only way to avoid this dictatorship is
to impose some preferences, violating Axiom 4.
Thus, the paradox of the intransitivity of the majority method is a manifesta-
tion of a difﬁculty so deeply embedded in the social choice problem that it can-
not be resolved without compromising the deﬁning axioms. It is an intuition-
building exercise to take the three orders shown in Table 9.1, and attempt to
combine them using a general procedure. It quickly becomes clear that transi-
tivity can be insured by dictatorship. Arrow’s Theorem proves essentially that
transitivity can only be insured by dictatorship.
2.4 Ways around the contradiction
Arrow’sTheorem shows that there isno method of aggregating social choice
that is guaranteed to satisfy all ﬁve axioms. Are all socio-political systems then
fundamentally irrational? Or are there systems that, implicitly or explicitly,
operate with restricted versions of one or more of the axioms, and thus avoid
gross inconsistency?
Arrow and others have attempted to resolve the paradox by weakening the
ﬁrst condition, arguing that in real political, economic, and even moral1 sys-
tems participants tacitly agree to structure their choices in a “logical” way, i.e.,
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in a way that keeps contradictions from arising. Thus Arrow introduces the
notion of single-peakedness as a way around the dilemma. A single-peaked
set of alternatives is ordered on some (one-dimensional) external scale, so that
each individual is free to choose a favorite alternative, but then must hold de-
scending regard for the other alternatives to the two sides of his ﬁrst choice.
The example of a political spectrum is given: each voter has a preferred, or
ideal party, and each step away from the ideal party, whether to the left or
to the right, is an ever less desirable alternative. This condition says nothing
about comparison between parties to the left and parties to the right of ideal.
If a condition of single-peakedness is substituted for the axiom of unrestricted
domain, then the Impossibility Theorem no longer holds. An abstracted par-
liamentary system thus avoids the difﬁculties of Arrow’s Theorem. Of course,
in a two-party system there is no contradiction, as the two-alternative situation
is not paradoxical.
In general, the difﬁculty of the Impossibility Theorem can be overcome by
restricting the freedom ofindividuals participating in the process by structuring
their preferences in some way. Ranking all alternatives on an external scale
as discussed above is one form of structure; allowing limited veto power is
another.
2.5 Numerical scales, or comparing strength of
feeling
Numerical scales for comparison of different attributes are key to the reso-
lution of the multi-criteria decision problem. Their introduction into the social
choice problem does not obviate the problems raised by Arrow’s Theorem, but
a discussion of why they do not solve the social choice problem will facili-
tate a later comparison with the multi-criteria decision problem. Consider the
example of the motivating paradox discussed above, with the individual vot-
ers’ weak orders from Table 9.1. A majority pairwise vote to combine these
three weak orders leads to an intransitive, and thus untenable answer. Consider
adding a numerical measure of strength of feeling to the problem, by suppos-
ing that each voter is given 10 points (or votes) to distribute among the three
alternatives. A representative combination with a weighted sum is shown here:
Table 2: Three voter’s preferences
A B C
Voter 1 6 3 1
Voter 2 1 7 2
Voter 3 2 0 8
Total 9 10 11Arrow's Theorem and Engineering Design Decision Making 213
In this case, there is no ambiguity: B is clearly preferred to A,a n dCis clearly
preferred to both A and B.
This solution, however, is accidental. If Voter 3, for instance, holds the
slightly different preferences shown here, preferences which are still consistent
with the weak order in Table 9.1, there is no longer a clear choice between the
three alternatives:
Table 3: Three voter’s alternate preferences
A B C
Voter 1 6 3 1
Voter 2 1 7 2
Voter 3 3 0 7
Total 10 10 10
Indeed, any possible ordering of A, B,a n dC , including indifferences, can
be achieved with numerical preferences consistent with the weak orders in
Table 9.1.
It is unclear whether the procedure of allotting ten votes to each individual
violates Axiom 3, the axiom of independence of irrelevant alternatives. Say
one of the three options is ignored. Then the comparison between the remain-
ing two is the same if the vote distributions remain identical. If, on the other
hand, the full ten votes must now be distributed over only two alternatives,
then the ﬁnal order can change. This procedure does not address the difﬁculty
raised by Arrow’s Theorem, where the only information allowed in the forma-
tion of the social order is the set of individual orders. Also, since any possible
social order may result from this method of combination, every individual has
a strong incentive to assign all ten points to their most preferred option, thus
returning the problem to the precise statement of Arrow’s Theorem.
Nor is the difﬁculty overcome by using different arithmetic (by letting each
individual rank each alternative on a scale of 1 to 10, say, or by aggregating
with something other than a weighted sum). A numerical scale cannot work in
the social choice problem. Because interpersonal comparison is not allowed,
the scale can only be assigned arbitrarily. While a particular scale may appear
to address an inconsistency for a particular problem, it is merely a matter of
arithmetic to recast the problem so that it is directly subject to Arrow’s Theo-
rem. The inability of numerical scales to address the social choice problem is
discussed further in the Appendix.
3. Decision with multiple criteria
The engineering design decision problem is not a social choice problem, but
instead is a decision with multiple criteria, that is: rank a number of alterna-
tives, each of which is ranked separately by several ranking criteria. Although214 IMPRECISION IN ENGINEERING DESIGN
this problem appears superﬁcially similar to the social choice problem, since it
seeks to combine several individual rankings into one, it is a distinct problem.
Two differences are:
In the social choice problem, all orderings are accorded equal worth.
In the multiple criteria problem, it is desirable to be able to assign im-
portance weightings to criteria. While it is natural to accord all human
voters equal worth, there is no obvious reason to require equal weighting
of the different engineering criteria that describe a device or system.
This difference may disappear if the weighted problem can be recast as
an unweighted problem with more individuals.
The social choice problem permits no interpersonal comparison of pref-
erences, and is thus limited to the discussion of weak orders. The heart
of the multi-criteria engineering problem is the inter-attribute compari-
son of preferences. When considering many design goals, it is crucial
to understand their relative importance and the way in which they inter-
act. Again, what is natural to require when modelling the sovereignty of
individual citizens is not necessarily applicable to separate engineering
design criteria.
This difference makes decision with multiple criteria structurally differ-
ent from social choice, and has deep implications for the applicability of
the Impossibility Theorem to engineering design decision-making.
Even the informal motivating paradox for the Impossibility Theorem (where a
majority vote ranked A before B before C before A) loses much of its power
if cast in the framework of multi-criteria decision-making. Consider the anal-
ogous example of a design or a product that is to be judged on the basis of
three criteria: x, y,a n dz . It is certainly plausible to assume that the designer
may be faced with a choice of three candidate designs, A, B, and C, such that
A is better than B is better than C with respect to criterion x, B is better than
C is better than A with respect to y,a n dCis better than A is better than B
with respect to z. The analogous “paradox” here is that giving x, y,a n dzone
vote each as a method to determine the best design yields no obvious answer.
In other words, if all that is known about a design is a weak order among al-
ternatives for each of the three criteria x, y,a n dz , then there is not enough
information to decide upon an overall best design. This “paradox” is resolved
in the multi-criteria problem by more careful consideration of preferences for
x, y,a n dz , and consideration of how those preferences interact. Note that
even if this decision is made by a group of three individuals, each responsible
for one criterion, there is still no paradox; the involvement of more than one
person does not by itself make group decision-making.Arrow's Theorem and Engineering Design Decision Making 215
A crucial assumption was made at the outset about the engineering design
decision problem. In general, in a real design situation, there is a rational weak
order among A, B,a n dC . 2Furthermore, that order could in principle be found
directly. The “paradox” is merely that additional information beyond the weak
orders on x, y,a n dzis required to recognize the overall order. The question
asked here is whether and when it is possible to ﬁnd consistent, rational tech-
niques to discover the ranking among A, B,a n dC . If so, it will necessarily be
with a slightly different set of assumptions from the ones of the Impossibility
Theorem, assumptions more appropriate for engineering decision-making than
for social choice.
3.1 Comparison of axioms for the two decision
problems
A careful examination of the axioms is necessary before considering the
Impossibility Theorem in the context of the design decision problem. When
combining engineering criteria (the multi-criteria problem), rather than indi-
vidual orderings (the social choice problem), the axioms of positive response,
independence of irrelevant alternatives, and inadmissibility of dictatorial so-
lutions still appear to hold. However, it is not obvious that domains must be
unrestricted or that orders must not be imposed.
The social choice problem must respect individuals by affording them the
freedom to order alternatives as they choose; in a design situation, cultural,
customer, or managerial structure is almost always imposed on the orders. For
instance, if the three candidate vehicle structure designs A, B,a n dChave
bending stiffnesses of 3000, 3200, and 3400 N/mm respectively, Axiom 1
states that any individual is free to express the preference C  A  B.A
vehicle structures group, however, which proposed this order to management,
would be criticized for “irrational” preferences over bending stiffness.T h e
order that ranks C  A  B is transitive, and any transitive order must be
considered rational in the social choice problem; it would be an acceptable
ﬁnal order of candidate designs. With respect to the particular evaluation cri-
terion of bending stiffness, however, it is not rational; many such transitive
orders would be considered irrational in an engineering context. No individ-
ual is given veto power in the social choice context; almost any attribute of an
engineered design has a level so unacceptable as to veto the entire design.
Recall that Arrow proposed single-peaked preferences as a way to resolve
the contradictions of the Impossibility Theorem: preferences are single-peaked
2This does not mean that there is one optimal solution that ﬁts all situations; a design situation includes
the attitudes and preferences of the people and corporate entities involved. Given the need for personal
transportation, some auto manufacturers choose to make luxury cars, while others choose to make economy
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when all options are ordered on an external scale, and each individual has one
preferred option and holds descending regard for alternatives to the two sides
of that preferred option. Engineering variables are almost always ordered on
an external scale, and preferences for engineering requirements are commonly
single-peaked around an ideal target. Indeed, nearly all engineering require-
ments are of one of three forms: less is better, more is better, or closer to a
particular target is better [3]. All three of these forms are single-peaked.
There are (rare) evaluation criteria that do not behave in a single-peaked
manner. A design preference for availability of a particular material stock may
be one criterion for a design, and it may change over time and take on any
order. The preference for the frequency of the ﬁrst acoustic mode is often to
avoid a particular unpleasant range. However, designers can and do restrict cri-
teria that are not globally single-peaked to regions of local single-peakedness.
The vehicle structure designer seeking to avoid a particular range of frequen-
cies of the ﬁrst acoustic mode, for example, chooses to target either higher or
lower frequencies, thus considering only a range over which the criterion is
single-peaked. Thus, while the completely generic design decision problem
should obey Arrow’s axiom of unrestricted domain, designers strive to avoid
the generic problem, and rather to cast each problem so that domains, rather
than being unrestricted, are single-peaked along the obvious external scales
provided by the design parameterization. Indeed, in terms of the decision
problem, the parameterization of a design serves to restrict domains. For the
multi-criteria decision problem, the axiom of unrestricted domain is replaced
by an exhortation to the designer to verify that criteria are single-peaked, or
restrict the problem until they are. It is understood that this may not always be
possible, but when it is not, the designer realizes that the design problem is not
completely well-conditioned. Such problems are difﬁcult for formal methods
and informal methods alike.
The axioms of the multi-criteria decision problem are thus not identical to
those of the social choice problem. Axiom 1 is crucial to the social choice
problem, while in the engineering design problem, it appears in a modiﬁed
form that is known to overcome Arrow’s Theorem. This difference in Ax-
iom 1 allows multi-criteria methods to operate on some large classes of prob-
lems without violating Arrow’s Theorem, even without the use of a numerical
scale to compare preferences across attributes. However, the differences in
axiomatic structure are minor compared to the difference in one fundamental
assumption: the social choice problem does not admit interpersonal compari-
son, while the multi-criteria decision problem would be meaningless without
inter-attribute comparisons. The next section will discuss how a numerical
scale for the inter-attribute comparison of preference is used in two contexts:
the aforementioned multi-criteria decision problem, and the related problem of
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There is a further, practical, difference between social choice and engineer-
ing design: designs have constraints. A maximum stress indicates the point at
which a design breaks and fails; government regulations must be fulﬁlled or a
design is not allowed on the market. However, it is usually far from obvious,
ap r i o r i , which candidate designs violate constraints, and the engineer must
be free to consider all potentially viable candidates. In decision theory, the
decision maker chooses among a neatly deﬁned set of viable alternatives; in
engineering design, deciding which are the viable alternatives is a major task,
often involving considerably more resources than the ﬁnal decision. Further-
more, the early consideration of infeasible designs is often a crucial part of the
reﬁnement process.
A decision method that captures this special feature of engineering design
would, in principle, violate Axiom 4. The positions of alternatives that fail
on the basis of a single criterion could be seen as imposed (to be last) in any
aggregated order. Constraints in engineering design, if translated into social
choice terms, are a sort of veto that individual criteria may exercise over the
entire decision, and thus violate the axiom of no imposed orders. However,
when the design is acceptable on the basis of each individual criterion, there is
no reason to abandon the axiom of no imposed orders. For the multi-criteria
engineering decision problem, the axiom of no imposed orders is weakened:
Axiom 4.4a (limited imposed orders) Axiom 4 holds, with the exception that
some alternatives may be declared unacceptable, and thus last in any com-
bined order, on the basis of an unacceptable ranking on a single criterion. All
unacceptable alternatives are equally unacceptable.
This modiﬁcation of Axiom 4 is not a signiﬁcant theoretical objection to the
application of Arrow’s Theorem in engineering design, as the same end can be
achieved by simply removing alternatives, after analysis, from consideration.
It does, however, provide a framework for decision methods for engineering
design that are capable of considering alternatives that may turn out later to be
infeasible.
4. Inter-attribute comparison of preference
Decision with multiple criteria differs empirically from social choice in an
important way. In the former, there is always a well-deﬁned aggregated order
among alternatives, which is available to anyone with the time and resources to
query a decision maker directly about all possible combinations; in the latter,
Arrow’s Theorem calls into question the very existence of a well-deﬁned ag-
gregated order. A direct speciﬁcation of preference in many dimensions in the
multi-criteria problem presents no more theoretical difﬁculties than a direct218 IMPRECISION IN ENGINEERING DESIGN
speciﬁcation of preferences in one dimension; the practical implementation,
however, can present great difﬁculty.
There is more than one way to assign a value function when a weak order
among alternatives is given. In this section, two distinct approaches to the
assignment of a value function are discussed: the utilities (or von Neumann–
Morgenstern utilities) [14, 8] that are used for decision-making under uncer-
tainty, and directly speciﬁed preferences such as those used in many multi-
criteria decision systems. Both techniques use inter-attribute comparison to
guarantee consistency (and avoid the pitfalls of the Impossibility Theorem),
but the emphasis in each is different.
4.1 Utility
The speciﬁcation of utility depends upon a weak order among alternatives,
and on the mathematics of expectation. To determine a utility function, the so-
called lottery question must have an answer: “Given that A is preferred to B,
and B is preferred to C, at which probability p is there indifference between the
two choices ‘B with probability 1’ and ‘a lottery that yields A with probability
p and C with probability (1 − p)’?” (Note that the question need not have a
direct answer; see [15], for instance, for a discussion of the elicitation of von
Neumann–Morgenstern utilities with little or no probability information.) Von
Neumann and Morgenstern [14] show that, given the assumption that utilities
combine with the mathematics of expectation, the numerical utility scale is
determined up to an afﬁne transformation.
The assumption of the use of mathematical expectation arises because util-
ity theory is intended to treat questions of decision-making under probabilis-
tic uncertainty, such as those that are germane to gambling. This makes the
speciﬁcation of relative utilities with probabilities natural. The lottery method
provides an elegant method to determine not only that A is preferred to B and
B is preferred to C, but also how great the preference is for A over B relative
to the preference for B over C.
However, the development of utility speciﬁcally excluded the notion of in-
terpersonal comparison of utility as too difﬁcult to address:
We do not undertake to ﬁx an absolute zero and an absolute unit of utility. [14,
footnote, p. 25]
Utility theory is intended for use in decision-making under uncertainty or risk,
rather than as a solution of the multi-criteria decision-making problem. Deci-
sion under uncertainty is often required in multi-criteria settings. [8] present
conditions under which a decision maker’s overall utility is a simple function
of individual, independent utility functions. The overall utility function is de-
termined by direct comparison of several alternatives in order to determine
appropriate weighting factors for the individual utility scales determined with
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soever to this sort of calculation; even if several people are involved in the
decision, there is an idealized single decision maker.
The success of the von Neumann–Morgenstern utility paradigm, and the
ease of its application in terms of quantiﬁed risk, have led to a situation in
which many decision problems are treated as problems of (economic) decision-
making under uncertainty. The lottery question seems natural, and so it is as-
sumed that the lottery question is the right way to impose a numerical scale
on preferences. Nevertheless, engineering design may not be best classiﬁed as
decision-making under risk and uncertainty. Utility theory is one paradigm for
decision-making, appropriate for a particular set of problems, those where the
“estimation of expectations for each option” is the most pertinent information.
When design reaches the manufacturing stage, and probability distributions
over manufacturing variations are usually the most relevant uncertainties, the
design decision problem is indeed similar to the problem addressed by util-
ity theory. Earlier in the design process, where uncertainty will be resolved
by reﬁnement of a design alternative, rather than by random selection from a
perceived distribution among alternatives, a utility model is less appropriate.
Direct preference speciﬁcation, for uncertainty other than quantiﬁed risk, will
be discussed in the next section.
From the point of view of classical utility theory, the design decision prob-
lem examined here isacase ofdecision-making under certainty. Intheclassical
utility theory view, the construction of the utility function and the choice of a
“best” solution with limited computation are uninteresting problems. The con-
struction of the utility function is only support for the subsequent question of
which course of action to select in the face of uncertain consequences.
4.2 Direct specication of preference
The engineering design decision problem that is the subject of this paper is
not primarily a problem of decision-making under uncertainty. While methods
such as those proposed by [8] could be applied to the problem, and the result-
ing utility function would indeed provide a basis for comparison of any two
alternatives, the relative complexity of these methods is not justiﬁed in cases
when no probabilistic uncertainty is to be incorporated in the problem. This
is particularly true as the number of individual performance criteria increases
(the number of coefﬁcients to be determined is 2n−1,w h e r enis the number of
criteria). Thus methods intended to solve the multi-criteria decision problem as
stated at the beginning of this paper, without the incorporation of uncertainty,
commonly use direct speciﬁcation of preference (e.g., QFD [6], AHP [13]).
Direct preferences, unlike utilities, are expressed on an absolute scale. For ex-
ample, a preference of  =1could indicate a completely acceptable value, and
 =0a completely unacceptable value. Alternatively, each criterion may be220 IMPRECISION IN ENGINEERING DESIGN
judged on a discrete scale (such as 1–3–9). The individual numerical orderings
associated with each criterion are then aggregated into an overall numerical
ordering of all alternatives based on all criteria simultaneously. The functions
used for aggregation of the orderings vary; a weighted arithmetic mean is a
common choice.
It was made clear earlier that Arrow’s Theorem does not apply to the en-
gineering design decision problem, whose chief concern is to compare prefer-
ences based on multiple attributes. Nevertheless, Arrow’s Theorem does bear
indirectly on the legitimacy of these methods: if the comparison of preferences
is effected by the arbitrary assignment of numbers to alternatives, then those
preferences contain no more information than weak orders, as discussed in
Section 2.5 and the Appendix. In that case no aggregation method is adequate.
A method that delivers an overall preference as a function of individual prefer-
ences must explicitly, and justiﬁably, compare individual preference values.
The individual preference orders may be generated by, or associated with,
different people or groups involved in a design. One of the motivations for the
engineering design decision problem as described in this paper is the need to
assess design alternatives for overall worthiness when the most readily acces-
sible information comes from many independent performance measures, each
of which is the responsibility of a different portion of a design team. If these
groups or individuals must be treated as autonomous citizens, then there is no
fair and rational way to combine their preferences. However, team design is
not driven by the need to respect the sovereignty of the individuals involved,
but rather by a desire to create superior products.
The team engineering decision problem thus has two aspects: the multiple
criteria problem, to which Arrow’sTheorem does not apply, and the problem of
collaboration, to which Arrow’s Theorem would apply if it were necessary to
guarantee sovereignty of team members. The mere involvement of groups does
not make it group decision making; in engineering, rather than social systems,
attributes, not people, must be reconciled. There are certainly difﬁcult and
interesting issues in the management of groups in an engineering context, but
Arrow’s Theorem does not make such management impossible.
5. Conclusions
This paper establishes the legitimacy of constructing aggregated preferences
in engineering design, even though such aggregation is not permissible in the
social choice problem. It does so by a thorough examination of the context
and results of Kenneth J. Arrow’s General Possibility Theorem. The design
decision problem has structural (axiomatic) peculiarities which make compar-
isons in the manner of social choice acceptable in engineering design; more
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the relative importance and interaction of individual preferences that violates
an assumption of citizens’ sovereignty in the social choice milieu.
Decision with multiple criteria and a single, idealized decision maker is
one problem in decision theory; social choice, in which each idealized indi-
vidual’s sovereignty must be guaranteed, is another. Engineering design often
falls somewhere in the middle, but even when many people are involved, the
group nature of the decision is subordinate to the multi-criteria aspect, as the
sovereignty of individuals is not necessary. Interesting parallels are evident
between the ideas expressed in this paper and different management styles [5].
A top-down management style would correspond to forcing a single decision
maker on the problem, whereas distributed control would correspond to the
group decision environment described here; in either case, the decision prob-
lem is framed in terms of engineering requirements rather than individuals’
desires.
The aggregation of preference in engineering design is often discussed as
the assessment of a utility function, though utility is a particular form of pref-
erence assessment that is useful in decision under uncertainty and risk. The
multi-criteria decision problem discussed in this paper does not include the in-
corporation of probabilistic uncertainty. The speciﬁcation of a multi-attribute
utility function for decision under uncertainty, and the use of direct speciﬁca-
tion of preferences for the resolution of the multi-criteria decision problem,
both avoid the problems raised by Arrow’s Theorem, but their emphases are
different.
While Arrow’s Theorem does not prove that the engineering design decision
problem treated here cannot have a rational answer, it does offer a caution to
methods that attempt to solve the multi-criteria decision problem: comparison
of preferences must be made explicit. The arbitrary assignment of numbers to
alternatives can lead to undesired conclusions. Similarly, the arbitrary assign-
ment of an aggregation method can lead to undesired conclusions. A decision
method must have an explicit procedure for assigning values to alternatives,
and for combining those values into a single performance function, and the
two must agree. If a decision method gives inadequate answers, it is not be-
cause Arrow’s Theorem declares that comparison is impossible; it is because
the particular implementation is ﬂawed — the representation and comparison
of preferences in the method are insufﬁciently rich.
Finally, the need in engineering design to consider and evaluate alternatives
that may turn out to be infeasible is not wellcaptured by the classic formulation
of the decision problem, where only feasible alternatives are considered. This
difﬁculty can be overcome by reformulating the decision problem whenever an
infeasible candidate arises. Alternatively, a decision methodology can handle
such constraints by a modiﬁcation of the underlying decision axioms.222 IMPRECISION IN ENGINEERING DESIGN
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A Appendix: Voting
In Section 2.5 the allotment of ten votes to each individual was proposed
as a potential way around Arrow’s Theorem, and was shown to be inadequate.
That point is discussed in more detail here.
Any of the sets of numerical preferences attributed to individual voters
in Section 2.5 can be recast as weak orders held by more voters. Combin-
ing all the weak orders of the ﬁctitious voters using the majority method of
decision-making will then yield the same social order as a weighted sum ag-
gregation of the numerical rankings, with ties in the majority method corre-
sponding to equal overall numerical rankings. To express 10 preference points
requires 20 individual weak orders: for example, if alternative A received 1 of
the 10 possible points, that is expressed by one weak order A  B  C, and
one A  C  B. (Two orders are required so that B and C are indifferent.)
Voter 2’s numerical preferences, for instance, are equivalent to the following
20 weak orders:
1st 2nd 3rd instances of this order
A B C 1
A C B 1
B C A 7
B A C 7
C A B 2
C B A 2
The entire weighted sum aggregation is equivalent to the majority method ap-
plied to 60 individual voters. However, these 60 individual orders do not obey
Axiom 1, as they are actually 30 dependent pairs. This clearly demonstrates
that the assignment of ten votes to each individual imposes restrictions that are
not in the original problem, which by deﬁnition must obey all the axioms of
Arrow’s Theorem. Indeed, this numerical method can be seen as an attempted
end run around Arrow’s Theorem, by the means of eliminating Axiom 1. Thus,
Arrow’s Theorem still applies: the use of a numerical method does not by itself
guarantee both fairness and consistency.